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II.-132 
SO MUCH TO COMMENT ON, SO LITTLE TIME: 
NOTICE-AND-COMMENT REQUIREMENTS IN 
AGENCY INFORMAL RULEMAKING UNDER  
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 
Abstract: On February 1, 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit decided National Lifeline Ass’n v. FCC. In National Lifeline 
Ass’n, the D.C. Circuit Court held that, by adopting changes to a tribal telecom-
munications subsidy that contradicted prior policy rationale after only a two-
week comment period, the agency both: (1) acted in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner, and (2) violated procedural requirements of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA). National Lifeline Ass’n represented a matter of first impression 
among the federal circuit courts and established a minimum comment period of 
thirty days for informal agency rulemaking. This Comment argues that the D.C. 
Circuit Court’s substantive holding aligned with prior case law, but that the pro-
cedural holding was inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in 
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council and 
the spirit of the APA. 
INTRODUCTION 
Federal agencies make decisions every day that affect Americans in both 
minute and significant ways.1 Congress passed the Administrative Procedure 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See generally Agency List, FED. REG., https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies [https://perma.
cc/7KVT-5HKS] (listing 449 federal agencies of varying size and scope, including the Gulf Coast 
Ecosystem Restoration Council, Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Federal Election Com-
mission, Refugee Resettlement Office, State Department, Travel and Tourism Administration, Com-
mission of Fine Arts, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Amtrak Reform Council, and the Civil 
Rights Commission). On any given day, agencies publish proposals to change or create regulations in 
the Federal Register. See Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2018) (requiring 
agencies to publish notices of proposed rules in the Federal Register); 44 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1505 (2018) 
(stating that all documents required to be published can be found in the Federal Register). The Federal 
Register is the “daily journal of the [f]ederal government.” About the Federal Register, NAT’L AR-
CHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/the-federal-register/about.html [https://perma.cc/
7LJN-G5QX]. The National Archives and Records Administration’s Office of the Federal Register pub-
lishes the Federal Register each business day. Id. In addition to proposed rules, the Federal Register also 
contains final agency rules, executive orders, and other executive documents. Id. On September 28, 2019, 
for example, the current daily issue of the Federal Register contained eight proposed agency rules, per-
taining to such issues as the Energy Department’s test procedure for ceiling fans and the Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation’s regulations on benefits payable in terminating single-employer plans. Document 
Search, FED. REG., https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/search?conditions%5Bpublication_
date%5D%5Bis%5D=2019-09-30&conditions%5Btype%5D%5B%5D=PRORULE [https://perma.
cc/JJZ5-ATM7]. 
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Act of 1946 (APA) in reaction to the rapid expansion of the administrative 
process.2 Congress’s goals were to: (1) create uniform procedure across di-
verse agencies and (2) “check” agency administrators who otherwise might 
push the boundaries of their agencies’ legislative mandates.3 The APA estab-
lished procedural requirements for rulemaking and adjudication and created a 
mechanism for judicial review of agency decisions.4 A court’s ability to over-
turn an agency’s substantive actions is limited under the APA.5 Therefore, fed-
eral courts have focused on their role in enforcing the APA’s procedural re-
quirements.6 When the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit attempted to 
add procedural requirements above what is required by the APA, the Supreme 
Court reversed the holdings.7 The APA requires three steps for informal rule-
                                                                                                                           
 2 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 644 (1950). 
 3 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41 (1950); Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 644. See 
generally 5 U.S.C. § 706 (requiring agencies to follow proscribed administrative procedure). Legisla-
tors were wary of administrators who, without sufficient protections, would impede individuals’ pri-
vate rights. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 644. The Final Report of the Attorney General’s Committee 
on Administrative Procedure, completed in 1941, guided the design of the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA). Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 n.31; COMM. ON ADMIN PROCEDURE, FINAL 
REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, S. DOC. NO. 77-
78, at 27 (1st Sess. (1941)) [hereinafter THE MANUAL]). Courts have looked to The Manual to inter-
pret the APA because the Department of Justice, which wrote The Manual, assisted in the promulga-
tion of the APA. See Brown, 441 U.S. at 302 n.31 (citing The Manual as persuasive authority for in-
terpreting the term “substantive rules” in the APA). 
 4 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (governing 
agency rulemaking and adjudication); id. § 706 (limiting the scope of judicial review of agency ac-
tions to considerations of whether an agency action is arbitrary or capricious, violates constitutional 
rights, or exceeds the agency’s jurisdiction). Rulemaking is an “agency process for formulating, 
amending, or repealing a rule.” Id. § 551(5). The APA’s definition of “rule” is broad. Id. § 551(4). A 
rule is a statement of general or particular applicability, and of future effect. Id. The rule could be to 
“implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy,” on the one hand, “or describe[e] the organization, 
procedure, or practice requirements of an agency” on the other. Id. The APA distinguishes rulemaking 
from agency adjudication, which means an “agency process for the formulation of an order,” with 
order being defined as “a final disposition . . . of an agency in a matter other than rule making but 
including licensing.” Id. § 551(5)–(7). Adjudication is more closely analogous to the judicial process 
of courts. FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 48 (Gary Lawson ed. 2016). A rule is comparable to a 
statute, so when an agency engages in rulemaking it must comply with certain procedures, just as a 
legislative body would in order to pass a law. Id. There is also a division within the rulemaking cate-
gory between informal and formal rulemaking, although those terms are not included in the APA. Id. 
at 306. The informal rulemaking process is outlined in § 553 of the APA, whereas the formal process 
spans §§ 556–557. Id. at 306–07. Formal rulemaking mirrors a trial procedure before a court, whereas 
informal rulemaking only requires that an agency follow basic administrative procedures. Id. The 
APA requires agencies conducting informal rulemaking to give notice of proposed rulemakings and 
allow interested people to participate in the process. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). 
 5 See infra note 22 and accompanying text (summarizing the judicial constraints in overturning 
agency action on substantive grounds). 
 6 FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 4, at 360–61. 
 7 Vt.Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 548 (1978). The 
Atomic Energy Commission (Commission) held a notice-and-comment period for a proposed rule 
about disposing uranium. Id. at 528. The Commission denied interested parties the ability to cross-
examine the Commission about the staff-prepared report it relied on, “Environmental Survey of the 
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making: (1) publishing a notice of proposed rulemaking, (2) providing an op-
portunity for public comment, and (3) publishing the final rule, along with an 
explanation of the rationale for the rule.8 The process of publishing a notice of 
proposed rule and receiving public comments is called a notice-and-comment 
period.9 
In 2019, in National Lifeline Ass’n v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit held that an 
agency may not depart from prior policy without: (1) holding a new notice-
and-comment proceeding of at least thirty days, (2) providing a reasoned ex-
planation for the change, (3) addressing past contradictory findings, and (4) 
accounting for reliance on past policy.10 The decision emphasized the im-
portance of giving interested people a meaningful opportunity to participate in 
the rulemaking process, yet established a minimum number of days for a 
comment period that is lower than experts recommend.11 The court’s decision 
to establish a bright-line directive, to be applied to all agencies regardless of 
the scope or impact of their proposed rule, did not account for the diversity of 
                                                                                                                           
Nuclear Fuel Cycle.” Id. at 528–29. The Commission did, however, make the report public and solicit 
public comment on the proposed rule. Id. at 529. The Natural Resources Defense Council appealed the 
final rule. Id. The D.C. Circuit set aside the agency action and held that the Commission’s rulemaking 
procedure was inadequate because the rule was complex and the Commission should have permitted 
the public to cross-examine the Commission on the integrity of the staff report. Nat. Res. Def. Coun-
cil, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 547 F.2d 633, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari, reversing the D.C. Circuit’s holding and sending a clear message that courts may 
not prescribe additional procedural requirements for informal rulemaking, above what the APA re-
quires. Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 525. Because the APA does not require agencies to permit cross-
examining during informal rulemaking, the D.C. Circuit overstepped. Id. at 546. 
 8 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
 9 Id. 
 10 See 921 F.3d 1102, 1112, 1114, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (pointing out the substantive and proce-
dural deficiencies in the Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC) adoption of two changes to the 
Tribal Lifeline program, a telecommunications subsidy for tribal lands); see also infra notes 93–95, 
102–109 (explaining the procedural and substantive holdings of National Lifeline Ass’n). Substantive-
ly, the FCC arbitrarily and capriciously adopted a rule that would negatively impact telecommunica-
tions access and affordability. Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1112, 1114. Procedurally, the FCC did 
not provide sufficient information in the proposed rule to solicit meaningful comments, nor did it give 
the public enough time to meaningfully comment. Id. at 1116, 1117. The FCC adopted the two chang-
es without “providing any reasoned explanation for its [policy] reversal.” Id. at 1112. The D.C. Circuit 
slightly amended the opinion on April 10, 2019, but did not change the holding of the case. Aaron L. 
Nielson, D.C. Circuit Review—Reviewed: Chevron Waiver, YALE J. REG. (Apr. 12, 2019), https://
www.yalejreg.com/nc/d-c-circuit-review-reviewed-chevron-waiver/ [https://perma.cc/MAP9-CPJB]; 
see Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 915 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir.), amended by 921 F.3d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (rear-
ranging a few words in the holding to clarify the outcome of the case). 
 11 See Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1117 (explaining that a two-week period was not an ade-
quate period for “eliciting meaningful comments” and establishing a minimum comment period across 
all agency informal rulemaking of thirty days); ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., A GUIDE TO FED-
ERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 124 (1983) [hereinafter GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING] 
(recommending a sixty-day comment period for complicated proposals that involve specialized, scien-
tific, or industrial materials). 
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agency mandates and processes and departed from procedural APA informal 
rulemaking case law.12 
Part I of this Comment frames the APA’s substantive and procedural re-
quirements for agency rulemaking.13 Part I also discusses the facts at issue in 
National Lifeline Ass’n that culminated in an APA challenge to the Federal 
Communication Commission’s (FCC) changes to the Tribal Lifeline program, a 
voice and broadband services subsidy for low-income households on federally-
recognized tribal lands.14 Part II explains the different positions argued before 
the D.C. Circuit on whether the FCC violated the APA’s procedural and substan-
tive requirements.15 Part III argues that the D.C. Circuit’s ruling followed rele-
vant case law and provided clear guidance for agencies to follow concerning the 
substantive requirements of the APA, but not the procedural requirements.16 
I. SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF AGENCY  
INFORMAL RULEMAKING UNDER THE APA 
In 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit contributed to the 
wealth of case law interpreting the APA in National Lifeline Ass’n v. FCC.17 
Section A of this part discusses the APA’s substantive requirements and the 
scope of judicial review of agency decisions.18 Section B discusses the APA’s 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See infra notes 110–136 and accompanying text (suggesting that the Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n pro-
cedural holding departed from APA precedent and administrative law theory). 
 13 See infra notes 17–49 (outlining the procedural requirements of agency rulemaking and de-
scribing judicial review of the substance and procedure of agency rulemaking). The APA imposes 
procedural requirements on agencies, such as publishing a notice of proposed rulemaking. 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553(b). Substantively, the APA prohibits an agency from acting arbitrarily or capriciously, or abus-
ing its discretion. Id. § 706(2). 
 14 Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1105, 1109, 1110; see infra notes 50–78 (illustrating the facts 
and procedural history of National Lifeline Ass’n). 
 15 See infra notes 79–109 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 110–136 and accompanying text (evaluating the National Lifeline Ass’n holding 
in light of prior case law). 
 17 Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1102; see infra note 22 and accompanying text (explaining the 
narrow judicial standard of review of the substance of agency decisions). 
 18 See infra notes 21–31 and accompanying text (summarizing the APA substantive requirements 
and the scope of judicial review of agency decisions); see also § 706(2) (requiring that courts give 
deference to federal agency decisions and only set aside unlawful decisions); Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 
F.3d at 1110–11 (applying the same limited scope of review as previous cases, which suggest reversal 
of agency decisions do not require a heightened standard of review). When an agency completely fails 
to hold a notice-and-comment period, the failure amounts to a non-harmless error, as opposed to a 
“mere technical defect.” Mid Continent Nail Corp. v. United States, 846 F.3d 1364, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 
2017). An error is harmless when it does not prejudice anyone. County of Del Norte v. United States, 
732 F.2d 1462,1467 (9th Cir. 1984). Compare California Wilderness Coalition v. U.S. Dep’t of Ener-
gy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1105–06 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that the Department of Energy’s decision not to 
complete an environmental study of the effects of designating national interest electric transmission 
corridors in an area covering four national forests was not a harmless error), with Ludwig v. Astrue, 
681 F.3d 1047, 1054–55 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that a Social Security Administration judge’s error 
in considering ex parte evidence was harmless because the judge would have reached the same con-
II.-136 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
procedural requirements, focusing on the notice-and-comment process.19 Sec-
tion C examines the factual and procedural history of National Lifeline Ass’n.20 
A. Standard of Judicial Review of Federal Agency Decisions 
Agencies have rulemaking power, but their final rules and the processes 
producing those rules are subject to judicial review by courts.21 Under the 
APA, a court reviews an agency action narrowly, discerning whether the agen-
cy surveyed relevant data before acting.22 An agency action at issue can be a 
full or a partial “agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent 
or denial thereof.”23 A failure to act also qualifies as an agency action.24 A 
                                                                                                                           
clusion without the error). Courts do not set aside agency errors that are harmless. County of Del 
Norte, 732 F.2d at 1467. The party attacking an agency’s determination bears the burden of showing 
that an error is harmful. Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 410 (2009). 
 19 See infra notes 32–49; see also 5 U.S.C. § 553; Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1117 (adopting 
the thirty-day minimum period for comments during an agency’s notice-and-comment process). 
 20 See infra notes 50–78. 
 21 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). 
 22 Id. (establishing areviewing court’s scope of review of agency decisions); Chevron, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (emphasizing the judicial tradition of 
agency deference); Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1110, 1115 (holding the FCC “failed to refer to 
data considering the impact of its Tribal Rural Limitation on incentivizing infrastructure develop-
ment”); see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514 (2009) (concluding that 
courts do not have heightened level of scrutiny for reviewing agency decisions to reverse course); 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983) (holding that an 
agency cannot substitute “post hoc rationalizations” of a decision to rescind an auto safety require-
ment during appellate review); Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 
(1962) (holding that the agency made no findings about possible results from two different remedies 
available under the Interstate Commerce Act and National Labor Relations Act). The APA defines 
“agency” as any authority of the U.S. government, with some exceptions, including Congress, the 
courts, and agencies that are statutorily exempt. 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1). The reviewing court sets aside 
agency actions that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law.” Id. § 706(2). The agency’s explanation must be clear enough that its “path may reasonably be 
discerned.” Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) (citing Bowman 
Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974)). 
 23 5 U.S.C. § 551(13). The term “agency action” covers a broad scope of activity. Id. For exam-
ple, a Navy Judge Advocate General’s suspension of a civilian attorney from practicing before naval 
courts constituted agency action. Partington v. Houck, 723 F.3d 280, 289 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Converse-
ly, the Bureau of Land Management’s approval of a budget request that included an overview for a 
“reinvigorated wild horses and burros program” did not constitute agency action because the program 
strategies included in the budget approval did not bind the field offices that would make the decisions. 
Fund for Animals, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 460 F.3d 13, 19, 20–21 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Ad-
ditionally, denial of an immigrant investor visa petition constitutes agency action. See Chiayu Chang 
v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 289 F. Supp. 3d 177, 182 (D.D.C. 2018) (reviewing the 
USCIS’s denial of a visa petition as an action under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). 
 24 5 U.S.C. § 551(13). In Jackson v. Lynn, the Federal Housing Authority’s (FHA) failure to en-
sure a home’s compliance with a local building code as a prospective buyer proposed purchasing the 
home with an FHA-insured mortgage would constitute agency action, if properly requested and de-
nied. 506 F.2d 233, 237–38 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The Atomic Energy Commission’s failure to prepare an 
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court will set aside actions that constitute abuse of agencies’ discretion, are 
arbitrary and capricious, or are otherwise unlawful.25 
Courts do not employ a more searching standard of review for changes in 
agency policy than the standard of review for a new policy.26 Just as they 
would for a new rule, agencies have to provide a reasoned explanation for a 
policy change, which would likely include demonstrating an awareness that it 
is changing its policy.27 An agency does not need to provide a more detailed 
justification than what it would provide for a new policy so long as: (1) the 
policy change falls within its statutory mandate, (2) the agency is cognizant of 
the change of position, and (3) the agency can point to satisfactory justification 
for the change.28 A court may not require an agency to prove that its new poli-
cy is better than the prior one.29 An agency may not, however, ignore reliance 
interests on its past policy, nor factual findings that conflict with its new poli-
cy.30 The court’s judicial review, therefore, is confined to reviewing the admin-
istrative record to ensure that the agency made reasonable decisions supported 
by substantial evidence.31 
                                                                                                                           
environmental impact statement prior to a power company acquiring the land would have qualified as 
agency action as well. Gage v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 356 F. Supp. 80, 84 (N.D. Ill. 1972). 
 25 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The arbitrary and capricious standard is deferential. Nat’l Ass’n of Home 
Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 658 (2007). A court may only vacate an agency’s decision 
if the agency relied on factors Congress did not direct it to consider, ignored an important aspect of its 
decision, directly contradicted relevant evidence and was therefore illogical, or is “so implausible” 
that the action “could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Id. 
(quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43). 
 26 Fox, 556 U.S. at 514. 
 27 Id. at 515; Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1110–11 (citing Encino, 136 S. Ct. at 2125); see 
also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1000–01 (2005) 
(explaining that the FCC had a reasoned explanation for analyzing cable modem service differently 
than Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) service because there are substitute forms for internet transmis-
sion, whereas there were no substitutions for DSL). 
 28 Fox, 556 U.S. at 515; Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1111. 
 29 Fox, 556 U.S. at 515. 
 30 Id. Parties develop reliance on agencies’ interpretations, so agencies must take this into ac-
count. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996). An agency decision that does not 
consider reliance interests on a prior agency position may be “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of 
discretion.” Id. But see NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974) (holding that where 
ramifications of reliance are not substantial or are speculative, an agency should not be prevented 
from considering a change). 
 31 Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1111; see Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 
1486, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (explaining that the court’s role was to decide whether a commission 
examined pertinent factors, like oil pipeline operation risks for the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission’s pipeline ratemaking rules, and provided a reasonable basis for its action). The administra-
tive record is the “record of administrative proceedings.” Wheatley v. Shields, 292 F. Supp. 608, 609 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
II.-138 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
B. Notice-and-Comment Under the APA 
Congress intended the APA to strike a balance between empowering gov-
ernment agencies and holding them accountable.32 To that end, the APA re-
quires agencies to preview proposed rule changes and solicit feedback before 
implementation.33 An agency must: (1) publish a notice of proposed rulemak-
ing, (2) give interested parties a chance to submit comments, (3) consider the 
comments, an (4) publish the final substantive rule, along with a succinct 
statement explaining the rationale for the rule.34 Through the APA’s notice-
and-comment requirements, the public has access to the rulemaking process 
and can therefore hold agencies accountable.35 
Pursuant to § 553 of the APA, when an agency publishes a proposed 
change, it must provide its rationale and sufficient details to allow interested 
parties to provide informed comments.36 The agency first publishes a notice of 
the proposed rule in the Federal Register, and then permits interested parties to 
submit written comments.37 The APA does not set a minimum length for the 
comment period.38 Courts have interpreted the APA as stating that agencies 
                                                                                                                           
 32 Darren Botello-Samson, The Neoliberal Erosion of Rights in Administrative Law, 19 TEX. 
TECH ADMIN. L.J. 247, 255 (2018); see also KENNETH F. WARREN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE 
POLITICAL SYSTEM 143 (4th ed. 2004) (describing the impetus for the APA and its systematic checks 
on agencies). 
 33 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c); see infra note 4 (defining informal rulemaking). 
 34 5 U.S.C. § 553; Cynthia R. Farina, et al., Rulemaking 2.0, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395, 401 
(2011). The description of the proposed rule and supporting information are included in the Federal 
Register publication for the public to read. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). 
 35 Brandon L. Garrett, The Public Interest in Corporate Settlements, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1483, 1511 
(2017); see Nina A. Mendelson, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1343, 1343–44 (2011) (explaining how rulemaking holds agencies accountable in a democratic 
system). The public is able to view and contribute to deliberations about proposed agency rules before 
they go into effect. Mendelson, supra, at 1343. Agency decisions are “kept aboveboard.” Id. 
 36 5 U.S.C. § 553(c); Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1115 (citing Fla. Power & Light Co. v. 
United States, 846 F.2d 765, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). Soliciting comments after promulgation of rules 
cannot replace a pre-promulgation notice-and-comment period. Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 
377, 381 (3d Cir. 1979). In certain emergencies, though, an agency can issue temporary interim rules 
that go into immediate effect. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Block, 655 F.2d 1153, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 
1981). In American Federation of Government Employees v. Block, the Department of Agriculture 
issued final rules without notice-and-comment because a federal district court had ordered it to reme-
dy discrimination in its poultry inspection rates enforcement. 655 F.2d at 1154–55. The D.C. Circuit 
held that issuing the emergency regulations was reasonable. Id. at 1157. 
 37 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (requiring agencies to publish notice in the Federal Register that includes 
logistical details of the rulemaking process, a citation to the statutory basis for the proposed rule, and 
an overview of the proposed rule); Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1115. The Federal Register is a 
daily serial publication of federal government documents that require public notice. Federal Register 
Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 1504–1505. When a notice is published in the Federal Register, it is deemed to have 
been given to all residents of the United States. Id. § 1508. The Federal Register is published in three 
formats: (1) paper, (2) microfiche, and (3) online at https://www.federalregister.gov/ [https://perma.
cc/FQ86-JXPN]. 1 C.F.R. § 5.10 (2020). 
 38 Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1117 (citing Petry v. Block, 737 F.2d 1193, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 
1984)). The APA merely requires that an agency publish notice of the proposed rule in the Federal 
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must give interested people sufficient time to comment meaningfully during 
the comment period.39 In 1983, the Administrative Conference of the United 
States (the Administrative Conference) responded to a common misconception 
about the APA having a minimum comment period of thirty days.40 Thirty 
days, the Administrative Conference wrote, is an inadequate time for people to 
respond to complicated proposals that involve specialized, scientific, or indus-
trial materials.41 Instead, the Administrative Conference opined that a sixty-day 
period is a “more reasonable minimum time for com[m]ent.”42 
Moreover, the original notice must sufficiently describe the proposed 
agency action, so that the subsequent final rule is a logical outgrowth of the 
initial proposal.43 The party to be affected by the rule then can anticipate the 
                                                                                                                           
Register and “give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making” by submitting 
materials to the agency. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). 
 39 See Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1117 (explaining that thirty days is the minimum amount 
of time needed to respond meaningfully to agency proposals). 
 40 Petry, 737 F.2d at 1201 (citing GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING, supra note 11). 
Congress created the Administrative Conference, an independent federal agency with between 75 and 
101 appointed members in 1966. Administrative Conference Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 591, 593. One of its 
statutory purposes is to “promote more effective public participation and efficiency in the rulemaking 
process.” Id. § 591(2). The Administrative Conference produced its Guide to Federal Agency Rule-
making in 1983. Petry, 737 F.2d at 1201. 
 41 Petry, 737 F.2d at 1201. As the D.C. Circuit noted in Petry v. Block, there is nothing “talisman-
ic” about a thirty-day minimum comment period. Id. In Petry, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of 1981 (OBRA) required the Department of Agriculture (Department) to expeditiously reduce certain 
reimbursements within the Child Care Food Program by ten percent. Id. at 1195. OBRA required the 
Department to implement regulations within sixty days, which it did, but without notice-and-
comment. Id. The D.C. Circuit held that the Department permissibly waived notice-and-comment 
because it would have been impracticable. Id. at 1201. Thirty days is the “shortest time in which par-
ties can meaningfully review a proposed rule and file informed responses.” Id. But as the Administra-
tive Conference suggested, sixty days is “a more reasonable minimum time” for notice-and-comment. 
Id. The Department therefore had insufficient time to conduct notice-and-comment before the statuto-
ry deadline, so it had good cause to waive the APA’s requirements. Id. 
 42 Id. (citing GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING, supra note 11, at 124). The parties that 
will be affected by a proposed rule “often are large organizations and they need time to coordinate and 
approve an organizational response or to authorize expenditure of funds to do the research needed to 
produce informed comments.” GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING, supra note 11, at 125. The 
Administrative Conference cited Executive Order 12,044, which set a minimum comment period of 
sixty days for all federal agencies. 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (Mar. 24, 1978). The executive order expired 
on June 30, 1980. Id. 
 43 Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1115 (citing Omnipoint Corp. v. FCC, 78 F.3d 620, 631 (D.C. 
Cir. 1996)). In Zen Magnets, LLC. v. Consumer Products Safety Commission, the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission adopted a regulation “restricting the size and strength of [certain] rare earth mag-
nets.” 841 F.3d 1141, 1144 (10th Cir. 2016). The Third Circuit held that the agency’s addition of “or 
commonly used” in the definition of a magnet set in the final rule was a logical outgrowth of the pro-
posed rule. Id. at 1154. The agency had demonstrated concern in its proposed rule that its proposed 
definition “would not address the risks of magnets ostensibly marketed for purposes other than enter-
tainment.” Id. The addition was therefore foreseeable, and thus, a logical outgrowth of the proposed 
rule. Id. Conversely, in Allina Health Services v. Sebelius, the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vice’s (DHHS) final rule about calculating payment adjustments in Medicare reimbursements was not 
a logical outgrowth of the proposed rule. 746 F.3d 1102, 1105, 1107–08 (D.C. Cir. 2014). DHHS had 
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agency’s final decision based on the notice.44 The affected party also has the 
opportunity to participate meaningfully in the rulemaking by offering written 
input.45 Following the notice period, the agency must include a “concise gen-
eral statement of their basis and purpose” in the final rules.46 
In reviewing agency decisions, courts may not impose additional proce-
dural requirements on agencies for rulemaking beyond what is required under 
the APA.47 In the 1978 landmark decision Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court respond-
ed to the D.C. Circuit’s activism in adding procedural steps to informal rule-
making.48 The Supreme Court held in Vermont Yankee that because Congress 
intended agencies to exercise discretion in determining when to add procedural 
steps, a court may not remand an agency decision for procedural inadequacies 
if the agency complied with the minimum APA requirements.49 
C. Factual and Procedural History of National Lifeline Ass’n 
For decades, the federal government has tried to achieve universal com-
munications services across the United States.50 It has done this by passing 
legislation, first with radio in 1934, and again with telecommunications and 
information services in 1996.51 In response to each congressional act, the FCC 
                                                                                                                           
reversed its interpretation about the calculation without giving any indication in the proposed notice 
that it would “reconsider[] a longstanding practice.” Id. at 1108. The final rule was not a logical out-
growth of the proposed rule because parties could not anticipate the change was possible. Id. at 1107, 
1109. 
 44 Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1115 (citing Covad Commc’ns Co. v. FCC, 450 F.3d 528, 548 
(D.C. Cir. 2006)). 
 45 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). Although it is not required, agencies may allow an interested party to offer 
oral input as well. Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 548. 
 48 Id.; see infra note 82 and accompanying text (citing cases where the D.C. Circuit added proce-
dural steps above the APA’s informal rulemaking requirements). 
 49 See Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 544, 546, 549 (holding that the D.C. Circuit improperly remanded 
agency decisions for lacking procedures that were not required by the APA). 
 50 See infra note 51 and accompanying text (describing the legislation Congress passed to expand 
access to communications services). First, Congress focused on radio as a communications service, 
and later, telephone and cable. See infra note 51 and accompanying text. Before Congress passed the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, only three percent of elementary and secondary education class-
rooms had internet access. S. REP. NO. 104-23, at 51 (1995). 
 51 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(1), (3) (2018) (making rapid, effi-
cient, reasonably-priced telecommunication services with adequate facilities available nationwide); 
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (making quality radio communications services avail-
able at just, reasonable, and affordable rates across all regions of the United States). The Communica-
tions Act of 1934 created the FCC, charged with regulating interstate and foreign communication 
commerce and expanding availability of wire and audio communication service with “adequate facili-
ties at reasonable charges.” 47 U.S.C. § 151. The key principles of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996 were “quality and rates,” “access to advanced services,” “access in rural and high cost areas,” 
“equitable and nondiscriminatory contributions,” “specific and predictable support mechanisms,” and 
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adopted various iterations of the Lifeline program, a voice and broadband ser-
vices subsidy for low-income households, to ensure that low-income consum-
ers have access to affordable landline telephone service.52 
Access to telecommunications and information services is especially lack-
ing on tribal lands.53 After consulting various tribal leaders, the FCC created 
the Tribal Lifeline program in 2000, which offered people who live on tribal 
lands an increased telecommunications services subsidy of twenty-five dollars 
per month.54 The Tribal Lifeline program considers tribal lands to be any “fed-
erally recognized Indian tribe’s reservation, pueblo, or colony.”55 Before the 
FCC established the Tribal Lifeline program in 2000, only forty-seven percent 
of Indian tribal households had a telephone, whereas approximately ninety-
four percent of all households in the United States had a telephone.56 The 
FCC’s “primary goal” in adopting the enhanced subsidy was to reduce the 
                                                                                                                           
“access to advanced telecommunications services for schools, health care, and libraries.” Id. § 254(b). 
The Telecommunications Act defines telecommunications as “transmission, between or among points 
specified by the user, of information of the user’s choosing, without change in the form or content of 
the information as sent and received.” Id. § 153(50). The Telecommunications Act defines infor-
mation service as “the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, pro-
cessing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications, and includes 
electronic publishing, but does not include any use of any such capability for the management, con-
trol, or operation of a telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications ser-
vice.” Id. § 153(24). 
 52 Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1105; FCC, Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 12 FCC 
Rcd. 8776, 8960 ¶ 346 (1997). The Lifeline Program provides a baseline monthly discount of $9.25 
for telecommunications services. 47 C.F.R. § 54.403 (2020). 
 53 See infra note 56 and accompanying text (describing the low percentage of people on tribal 
lands with telephones). 
 54 Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1107; 47 C.F.R. § 54.403(a)(3); Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Uni-
versal Serv., 15 FCC Rcd. 12208, 12212 ¶¶ 5, 13 (2000) (2000 Tribal Lifeline Order); Statement of 
Policy on Establishing a Gov’t-to-Gov’t Relationship with Indian Tribes, 16 FCC Rcd. 4078, 4081 
(2000) (noting the FCC affirmed principles of tribal sovereignty by committing to consult tribal gov-
ernments before enacting policies or rules that will impact their tribes). The FCC convened two meet-
ings with Indian tribal leaders where the leaders identified telecommunications-access problems like 
“geographic isolation,” “lack of information,” and “economic barriers.” Statement of Policy on Estab-
lishing a Gov’t-to-Gov’t Relationship with Indian Tribes, 16 FCC Rcd. at 4079. Participants in the 
process included representatives from Chickasaw Nation, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, Salt River Pi-
ma-Maricopa Indian Community, Oneida Nation, and Cheyenne River Sioux. Fed.-State Joint Bd. on 
Universal Serv., 14 FCC Rcd. 21177, 21241 app. A (1999). The FCC explained that basic telecom-
munications services are a “fundamental necessity in modern society,” and low-income individuals 
without basic telecommunications services fall further behind their counterparts connected to the 
telecommunications infrastructure. 2000 Tribal Lifeline Order, 15 FCC Rcd. at 12212 ¶ 3.  
 55 47 C.F.R. §§ 54.400, 54.403(a)(3). Tribal lands also include: “former reservations in Oklaho-
ma,” “Alaska Native regions,” “Indian allotments,” “Hawaiian Home Lands,” and any “off reserva-
tion” land designated as “tribal” by the FCC. Id. § 54.400 (citing 47 C.F.R § 54.412). Under the Fed-
erally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994, the Secretary of the Interior is required to publish in 
the Federal Register an annual list of all Indian Tribes that qualify for government services. 25 U.S.C. 
§ 5131 (2018).  
 56 2000 Tribal Lifeline Order, 15 FCC Rcd. at 12211–12. 
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monthly cost of telecommunications services for low-income households on 
tribal land, so that eligible people would subscribe to and continue services.57 
Under the Tribal Lifeline Program, the FCC provides subsidies to eligible 
telecommunications carriers (ETCs).58 To be an ETC, a carrier needs to offer 
telecommunications services employing entirely their own facilities or their 
own facilities supplemented with additional facilities owned by separate carri-
ers.59 Initially the FCC interpreted “own facilities” as implying that only facili-
ties-based providers could qualify for Lifeline subsidies.60 Facilities-based 
providers, as opposed to non-facilities-based providers, own the transmission 
facilities that they use to connect end users to the telecommunication ser-
vices.61 Beginning in 2005, recognizing that welcoming non-facilities-based 
providers to the program would expand consumer choice, the FCC departed 
from prior policy by allowing non-facilities-based providers to provide Life-
line services.62 The FCC formalized this decision by issuing a forbearance or-
der, granting providers reprieve from the facilities requirement for ETC desig-
nation for Lifeline support.63 In 2015, almost two-thirds of customers living on 
                                                                                                                           
 57 Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1107 (citing 2000 Tribal Lifeline Order, 15 FCC Rcd. at 
12231 ¶¶ 44) (recognizing that households on tribal lands needed enhanced subsidy support because 
of the “extraordinarily low” average incomes in tribal areas, the high tolls in “limited local calling 
areas,” “the disproportionately low subscribership levels,” and the low participation in the standard 
Lifeline program). 
 58 Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1106–07 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 214 (e)(2), (6)). 
 59 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(1)(A); see infra note 60 and accompanying text (explaining how the FCC 
has interpreted “own facilities”). An ETC must also advertise its telecommunications services through 
common media platforms. 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(1)(B). 
 60 Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1108; see infra note 61 and accompanying text (defining facil-
ities-based providers). The FCC’s rationale before 2005 was that if eligible for the program, non-
facilities-based providers would recover twice. Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1108. The non-
facilities-based providers would purchase services from the facilities-based providers, which were 
subsidized, and then would receive an additional subsidy as ETCs. Id. 
 61 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 979 (2005) 
(explaining that non-facilities-based internet providers do not own the cable services that they provide 
to consumers but instead offer other providers’ services to the consumers). The facilities-based pro-
viders do not need to contract with another provider for the transmission. Id. Transmission means “the 
passage of radio waves in the space between transmitting and receiving stations.” Transmission, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/transmission [https://
perma.cc/54BB-6BSH]. 
 62 Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1108. The FCC saw expanding consumer choice as beneficial. 
Id. 
 63 Id. (citing Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 20 FCC Rcd. 15095, 15100–01 (2005) 
(TracFone Wireless) (denying petition by TracFone Wireless for forbearance, and concluding the 
“own facilities” requirement met the 1996 Act’s criteria for forbearance because: (1) there was no 
double recovery because resellers’ rates were not subsidized, (2) forbearance would benefit consum-
ers, and (3) forbearance would expand eligible participation, which was in the public interest). For-
bearance means to “render inapplicable” part of a statute. Daniel T. Deacon, Administrative Forbear-
ance, 125 YALE L. J. 1548, 1551 (2016). The Communications Act permits the FCC to “formally 
deprive portions of the [Communications] Act of their legal force.” Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 160). Be-
cause of the forbearance policy, non-facilities-based providers like TracFone Wireless were eligible 
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tribal lands who qualified for the program received Lifeline services through a 
non-facilities-based provider.64 
Ten years after the forbearance order, the FCC embarked on revising the 
Lifeline services again.65 In June 2015, the FCC opened a rulemaking proceed-
ing to restructure both the Lifeline and Tribal Lifeline programs.66 The FCC 
sought comment about potentially providing support exclusively to facilities-
based providers (facilities requirement) and less populated tribal regions (rural 
limitation).67 After the comment period closed, the FCC issued a final rule.68 
The rule made significant changes to the Lifeline program, but made no altera-
tions to the Tribal Lifeline program.69 
Despite stating in the 2016 order that it would hold another proceeding 
before making those changes, the FCC promulgated a draft order on October 
26, 2017 that embodied a facilities requirement and a rural limitation.70 The 
facilities requirement limited Tribal Lifeline support to “fixed or mobile wire-
less facilities-based” providers, as opposed to non-facilities-based, or reseller, 
providers.71 The rural limitation restricted the Tribal Lifeline subsidy to people 
                                                                                                                           
for Tribal Lifeline ETC designation. Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1108. The FCC expected that 
low-income consumers would find TracFone’s services more accessible than those of other providers, 
because its prepaid option was free from usage charges or long-term contracts. TracFone Wireless, 20 
FCC Rcd. at 15101. Moreover, TracFone assured the FCC that consumers could place 911 calls from 
their phones, even when a consumer’s plan was not active or had run out of prepaid minutes. Id. Ac-
cording to the Forbearance Order, the FCC had a duty to ensure a “seamless, ubiquitous, and reliable 
end-to-end infrastructure for public safety.” Id. at 15102. 
 64 Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1108. 
 65 Id. at 1109. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id.; Lifeline & Link Up Reform & Modernization, 30 FCC Rcd. 7818, 7875–76 ¶¶ 167, 169–70 
(2015) (2015 Lifeline Second FNPRM). The notice in 2015 did not specify a cut-off population densi-
ty for its proposed limitation, but rather provided examples of areas with higher and lower population 
density. 2015 Lifeline Second FNPRM, 30 FCC Rcd. at 7876 ¶¶ 169–70.  
 68 Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1109. 
 69 Id. (citing Lifeline & Link Up Reform & Modernization, 31 FCC Rcd. 3962, 3964 ¶¶ 6–8, 
4036–38 ¶¶ 205–11 (2016) (2016 Lifeline Order) (“[T]he Commission established minimum service 
standards for broadband and mobile voice services, created a National Verifier program to ensure only 
eligible subscribers may enroll in Lifeline support, and encouraged the entry of new broadband pro-
viders into the Lifeline program.”); 2016 Lifeline Order, 31 FCC Rcd. at 4036–38 ¶¶ 205–11 (stating 
that certain Tribal Lifeline eligibility issues it raised in the proceeding, including the proposed facili-
ties requirement and eligibility restriction to only rural areas would “remain open for consideration in 
a future proceeding”). 
 70 Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1109 (citing FCC, FCC FACT SHEET: BRIDGING THE DIGITAL 
DIVIDE FOR LOW-INCOME CONSUMERS (2017), https://www.fcc.gov/document/bridging-digital-divide-
low-income-consumers [https://perma.cc/B6H9-JHSP] [hereinafter 2017 LIFELINE ORDER]); 2016 
Lifeline Order, 31 FCC Rcd. at 3962, 4036–38 ¶¶ 205–11; see infra notes 71, 72 and accompanying 
text (explaining the facilities requirement and rural limitation). 
 71 2017 LIFELINE ORDER, supra note 70, ¶¶ 22, 24 (defining a “fixed or mobile wireless facilities-
based service” to mean providers that “hold usage rights under a spectrum license or a long-term spec-
trum leasing arrangement along with wireless network facilities that can provide wireless voice and 
broadband services”). About sixty-two percent of all Tribal Lifeline subscribers that use wireless services 
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living in rural, as opposed to urban, tribal areas.72 Following a seven-day 
comment period, on November 9, 2017, the FCC announced the beginning of a 
Sunshine Period, during which interested persons could not lobby the FCC.73 
One week later, on November 16, 2017, the FCC formally instated the facili-
ties requirement and rural limitation.74 
Tribal Lifeline program beneficiaries filed a petition for an administrative 
stay of the order, which the FCC denied.75 The beneficiaries then filed a mo-
tion for a judicial stay, which the D.C. Circuit Court granted.76 The beneficiar-
ies then sued the FCC, challenging the facilities requirement and rural limita-
tion.77 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals granted a petition for review to re-
solve two key issues: (1) whether the FCC acted arbitrarily and capriciously 
when it adopted the facilities requirement and rural limitation, and (2) whether 
its process violated APA informal rulemaking procedural requirements.78 
                                                                                                                           
relied on non-facilities-based providers. Joint Opening Brief of Petitioner Crow Creek Sioux Tribe and 
Intervenor Oceti Sakowin Tribal Utility Authority at 11, Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d 1102 (Nos. 18-
1026, 18-1080). Facilities-based wireless carriers like AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile ceased providing 
Lifeline services in many places because they were not profitable. Joint Opening Brief of Petitioner Crow 
Creek Sioux Tribe and Intervenor Oceti Sakowin Tribal Utility Authority, supra, at 8–9. This left Sprint 
as the only major carrier still actively participating in the program. Id. Smaller non-facilities-based pro-
viders that specialized in serving low-income consumers replaced the larger providers, becoming 
conduits between the larger, facilities-based providers and the beneficiaries of the Tribal Lifeline 
program. Id. at 7, 11–12. That shifting dynamic is what prompted the FCC to waive the facilities-
based requirement through the forbearance policy in 2005. Id. at 10. Suddenly, with the facilities re-
quirement implementation in 2017, these smaller providers that specialized in serving low-income 
customers could no longer qualify to participate in the Tribal Lifeline Program. Id. at 12. 
 72 2017 LIFELINE ORDER, supra note 70, ¶¶ 3–5 (adopting the definitions of “rural” and “urban” 
used in the FCC’s Schools and Libraries Program, defining “urban” as an “area with a population 
equal to or greater than 25,000,” and “rural” as any area that is not “urban”); 47 C.F.R. § 54.505(b)(3). 
 73 Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1109; see 47 C.F.R. § 1.1200(a) (prohibiting all presentations 
to the FCC about a proposal during a Sunshine Period). 
 74 Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1109. 
 75 Id. at 1110. Pursuant to the APA, an agency may “postpone,” or stay, “the effective date of 
action taken by it, pending judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. § 705; Sierra Club v. Jackson, 833 F. Supp. 2d 
11, 33 (D.D.C. Cir. 2012). The FCC denied the stay petition filed collectively by Assist Wireless, 
LLC, Boomerang Wireless, LLC, Easy Telephone Services Company, the National Lifeline Associa-
tion, the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe, and the Oceti Sakowin Tribal Unity Authority. Bridging the Digital 
Divide for Low-Income Consumers, 33 FCC Rcd. 6353, 6353 (2018) (order denying petition for stay). 
 76 Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1110; see also Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n v. FCC, No. 18-1026, 2018 
WL 4154794 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (granting petitioner National Lifeline Association’s motion for stay of 
the FCC’s implementation of the 2017 changes to the Tribal Lifeline Program). A judicial stay 
“halt[s] or postpone[s] some portion of [a] proceeding” or “temporarily divest[s] an order of enforcea-
bility.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009). A party requesting a judicial stay bears the burden 
of proving four factors. Id. The four factors are: (1) that the party will likely succeed on the merits of 
its claim, (2) that the party will be “irreparably injured absent a stay,” (3) that a stay will not “substan-
tially injure” other parties, and (4) that the public interest tilts in favor of a judicial stay. Id. 
 77 Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1110. 
 78 Id. at 1105–06. 
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II. LEGAL CONTEXT AND FRAMEWORK OF NATIONAL LIFELINE ASS’N 
Before 2019, no circuit court of appeals had set a bright-line rule for the 
minimum number of days of notice-and-comment in informal rulemaking un-
der the APA.79 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit’s decision in National Lifeline Ass’n v. FCC was a matter of first impres-
sion regarding whether an agency may make changes to a program without 
convening a new notice-and-comment rulemaking proceeding of at least thirty 
days.80 Circuit courts had previously ruled on what constitutes meaningful par-
ticipation in an agency’s rulemaking process.81 Where the circuit courts, par-
ticularly the procedurally activist D.C. Circuit, have attempted to set certain 
bright-line rules for rulemaking processes above what the APA requires, the 
Supreme Court has reversed.82 Unsurprisingly, then, no federal appellate court 
                                                                                                                           
 79 See infra note 80 and accompanying text (explaining that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit decided on a matter of first impression in 2019 with regards to agency 
informal rulemaking procedures). 
 80 921 F.3d 1102, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Daniel Lyons, Court Decision Casts Shadows on Life-
line Reforms, AM. ENTERPRISE INST.: AEIDEAS (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.aei.org/technology-and-
innovation/telecommunications/court-decision-casts-shadow-on-lifeline-reforms/ [https://perma.cc/
5E9W-RX33] (commenting that the ruling in Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n was the first time a circuit court had 
set a bright-line rule on the minimum number of days for a comment period in informal rulemaking); 
see infra notes 102–108 and accompanying text. 
 81 See supra notes 32–49 and accompanying text (describing administrative procedure case law). 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also said that post-hoc comment periods are not 
adequate substitutes for prior notice-and-comment. U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 649 F.2d 572, 577 (8th 
Cir. 1981). 
 82 See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 546 (1978) 
(overturning the D.C. Circuit’s holding for demanding procedural requirements above what the APA 
requires). The D.C. Circuit is familiar with judicial activism in the administrative law context. FED-
ERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 4, at 356–58. The D.C. Circuit decides about one-third of all 
appeals pertaining to significant federal administrative law issues. Id. at 356. Beginning in the 1960s, 
the judges sitting on the D.C. Circuit became increasingly concerned with environmental issues and 
agency capture. Id. at 357–58. The judges debated the proper scope of judicial review of agency ac-
tion, with Judge David Bazelon advocating to strengthen administrative procedures and Judge Harold 
Leventhal countering with the “hard look” alternative. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., “History Belongs 
to the Winners”: The Bazelon-Leventhal Debate and the Continuing Relevance of the Pro-
cess/Substance Dichotomy in Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 995, 999–1000, 
1002 (2006). Judge Bazelon doubted judges’ capabilities to evaluate agency decision making. Id. 
Instead, he thought that courts should establish agency procedural requirements that would assure 
reasoned decisions that withstand “the scrutiny of the scientific community and the public.” Id. (quot-
ing Int’l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, J., concurring)). 
In contrast, under Judge Leventhal’s “hard look” theory, the APA required courts to carefully examine 
agency records to determine whether the final rules adopted were rational and plausible. Id. at 1002. 
Notwithstanding this ideological divide, the D.C. Circuit focused its efforts on procedural activism 
and designed, through a series of cases, “hybrid APA rulemaking,” which included an array of proce-
dural additions to informal rulemaking, like permitting oral testimony and disclosing relevant studies 
to the public. FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 4, at 361; see, e.g., Portland Cement Ass’n 
v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393 (1973) (requiring agencies to disclose studies they rely on for their 
proposed rules); Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1015, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (requiring 
agencies to grant parties the opportunity to present oral testimony in certain cases). This line of cases, 
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adopted a minimum number of days for an agency rulemaking comment period 
before National Lifeline Ass’n.83 Part A will discuss the APA’s substantive re-
quirements, and Part B will discuss the procedural requirements.84 
A. APA Substantive Requirements 
The petitioner first challenged the FCC on substantive grounds.85 Peti-
tioner, National Lifeline Association, and co-parties requested that the D.C. 
Circuit Court strike down the changes to the Tribal Lifeline program.86 Specif-
ically, the petitioners posited that the FCC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in 
adopting the facilities requirement and rural limitation.87 
In response, the FCC contended that both the facilities requirement and 
rural limitation were reasonable.88 The FCC argued that the facilities require-
ment was reasonable because the FCC intended to improve program spending 
and better promote telecommunications infrastructure development in tribal 
areas.89 To the FCC, the final facilities requirement rule was a logical out-
                                                                                                                           
which expanded procedural requirements, culminated in Vermont Yankee, where the Supreme Court 
halted the D.C. Circuit’s development of a common law of hybrid APA rulemaking. See 435 U.S. at 
546 (emphasizing that agencies can formulate their own rules of procedure as long as they meet the 
requirements within the APA, and that courts should not impose additional procedural requirements 
above what the APA requires). 
 83 Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1117; see Petry v. Block, 737 F.2d 1193, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (citing GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING, supra note 11, at 124) (explaining that the 
APA does not specify a minimum comment period in informal rulemaking, but that the Administra-
tive Conference of the United States suggests that parties need at least thirty days to meaningfully 
comment on a proposed rule). 
 84 See infra notes 85–95 and accompanying text (Part A); infra notes 96–109 and accompanying 
text (Part B). 
 85 See infra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 86 Final Brief of Petitioners National Lifeline Association; Assist Wireless, LLC; Boomerang 
Wireless, LLC d/b/a Entouch Wireless; Easy Telephone Services Company d/b/a Easy Wireless at 20, 
26, 41, 48–49, Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d 1102 (Nos. 18-1026, 18-1080) [hereinafter Final Brief of 
Petitioners] (positing that the facilities requirement and rural limitation were not logical outgrowths of 
the 2015 proposal, the benefits of the two limitations were speculative, and the changes departed from 
FCC policy about facilities).  
 87 Final Brief of Petitioners, supra note 86, at 26–27, 47, 49, 52 (arguing that the FCC’s conten-
tion that limiting eligibility to facilities-based providers would promote facilities deployment on tribal 
lands was speculative and that the FCC unreasonably departed from years of findings that a facilities 
requirement would undermine the purposes of the Lifeline program). Petitioners argued that the facili-
ties requirement would have the opposite of the intended effect, because restricting eligibility would 
force many providers out of business and reduce competition, thereby decreasing affordability of 
service. Final Brief of Petitioners, supra note 86, at 42. 
 88 Corrected Brief for Respondents at 42, 47, Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d 1102 (Nos. 18-1026, 
18-1080). 
 89 Id. at 17. The FCC referenced an “exponential rise of Lifeline spending,” and “waste, fraud, 
and abuse” that previous changes to the program did not successfully curtail. Id. By limiting ETC 
eligibility to facilities-based providers, the FCC would ensure that funds would go directly into 
providing services. Id. at 17, 18. Funding resellers, alternatively, could “marginally increase the abil-
ity and incentive of other providers to deploy or maintain facilities.” Id. at 18–19. The marginal in-
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growth of the agency’s prior notice.90 Additionally, the FCC contended that the 
rural limitation was reasonable because rural areas had the highest need, yet 
the fewest available providers.91 
The D.C. Circuit sided with the National Lifeline Association, citing sub-
stantive deficiencies in the 2017 order for both the facilities requirement and 
the rural limitation.92 The FCC had ignored how the changes would affect af-
fordability and access and failed to rationalize the FCC’s policy pivot on the 
“own facilities” requirement.93 The FCC also failed to deliberate on important 
implications of a Tribal Lifeline facilities requirement.94 The rural limitation 
was arbitrary and capricious as well because the FCC failed to evaluate rele-
vant data on access to affordable telecommunications services in rural, as op-
posed to urban, tribal areas.95 
                                                                                                                           
crease, however, was “outweighed by [the FCC’s] need to prudently manage [Tribal Lifeline] Fund 
expenditures.” Id. at 19. The FCC also argued that the changes were “firmly grounded in logic and in the 
record.” Id. at 18. 
 90 Corrected Brief for Respondents, supra note 88, at 22–23 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(2018) 
and Agape Church, Inc. v. FCC, 738 F.3d 397, 422 (D.C. Cir. 2013)). In Agape Church, Inc., the FCC 
promulgated a rule allowing certain types of cable networks to provide conversion equipment for 
customers with analog, as opposed to digital, cable service, instead of converting the signals before 
transmission. 738 F.3d at 400, 401. The petitioners claimed the informal rulemaking process violated 
the APA because the final rule was not a “logical outgrowth” of the proposed rule. Id. at 401. The 
D.C. Circuit held that the final rule was a “logical outgrowth because “[t]he broadcasters in th[e] case 
certainly should have anticipated that the final rule was a viable result in light of the [notice of pro-
posed rulemaking], and also in light of the fact that [the predecessor rule] was due to sunset unless 
extended.” Id. at 412.  
 91 Corrected Brief for Respondents, supra note 88, at iii, 13, 57, 59 (explaining that ninety-eight 
percent of Americans in urban areas already have access to multiple service providers, compared to 
thirty-seven percent in tribal rural areas). 
 92 See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text. 
 93 See Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1111–12 (pointing out that the FCC “never explained why 
its previous forbearance findings no longer applied” in 2017). Affordability and access are key goals 
for the Tribal Lifeline program. Id. 
 94 Id. at 1114 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
43 (1983)) (holding that the FCC’s departure from its prior forbearance policy without reasoned ex-
planation and failing to consider the reality of the program was arbitrary and capricious). The FCC did 
not address the facilities-based providers’ unwillingness to offer Tribal Lifeline services, the effect the 
change would have on access, affordability, and buildout, or the reliance interests of carriers and their 
consumers. Id. at 1105–06, 1111. Non-facilities-based providers had invested in participating in the 
Lifeline program, for example, by purchasing many telephone minutes from the larger carriers to 
resell to customers. Id. at 1114. Consumers relied on being able to afford services through the re-
sellers. Id. The resellers estimated that seventy-five percent of Tribal Lifeline customers would not be 
able to pay the additional twenty-five dollars per month if resellers were no longer eligible. Id. 
 95 See id. at 1115 (deciding that the FCC could not substantiate its claim that telecommunications 
services on urban tribal lands are cheaper and easier to access than those on rural tribal lands, so the 
FCC could not argue that limiting the subsidy to rural lands would better pursue the program’s prima-
ry goals of access and affordability). 
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B. APA Procedural Requirements 
Pursuant to the APA, agencies must conduct notice-and-comment before 
issuing final rules.96 In the eyes of the petitioners, the FCC first and foremost 
violated the APA when it suggested to commenters that it would not implement 
changes to the Tribal Lifeline program in the 2015-2016 proceeding and then 
implemented them in 2017 without offering further notice and opportunity to 
comment.97 The petitioners suggested that by declining to address the facilities 
requirement and rural limitation in the 2016 order and by emphasizing that 
issues not addressed in the order would be taken up in a future proceeding, the 
FCC committed to opening a new notice-and-comment proceeding before 
adopting new rules.98 
Conversely, the FCC contended that it did not violate the APA’s proce-
dural requirements, because it provided plenty of notice and opportunity for 
comment prior to adopting the facilities requirement and rural limitation.99 The 
FCC argued that, should the facilities requirement not be considered a logical 
outgrowth of the 2015 period, any inconsistency with APA procedure was 
harmless because the FCC published their intended changes for the 2017 order 
three weeks before they went into effect.100 The FCC also contended that it 
consulted tribal governments, although it was not required to do so.101 
Again, the D.C. Circuit Court sided with the petitioners, holding that the 
FCC’s rulemaking process contained procedural failings that were not harm-
less.102 First, the rural limitation was not a logical outgrowth of the FCC’s pro-
                                                                                                                           
 96 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c). 
 97 Final Brief of Petitioners, supra note 86 at 21. 
 98 Id. at 22, 25 (arguing that by seeking comment in 2017 on many of the issues addressed in 
2015, such as how to define “facilities” and “rural,” the FCC showed its record in the 2017 proceeding 
was incomplete). 
 99 Corrected Brief for Respondents, supra note 88, at 22–23 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)) (argu-
ing that the final rules were logical outgrowths of the proposed initiatives from 2015). The FCC ar-
gued that the FCC provided “general notice” of proposed rulemaking in 2015. Id. at 22. The FCC 
claimed it “made clear” that it was considering the two limitations to “encourag[e] infrastructure build-
out” during the 2015 notice-and-comment rulemaking period and that petitioners could “hardly have 
been blindsided” by the 2017 changes. Id. at 23–24. 
 100 Corrected Brief for Respondents, supra note 88, at 25 (arguing that the Commission received 
“substantial input” in response to the draft order, including comments from and meetings with peti-
tioners). Respondents also said they typically close the rulemaking docket once they issue a final rule. 
Id. at 30. They kept the docket open in 2016, however, because they intended to resolve unaddressed 
questions in a “future proceeding.” Id. 
 101 Corrected Brief for Respondents, supra note 88 at 32. The tribal consultation policy is the 
FCC’s commitment to “consult with Tribal governments” where “practicable” before adopting a rule 
that would “significantly impact ‘Tribal governments, their land and resources.’” Id. (citing Statement 
of Policy on Establishing a Gov’t-to-Gov’t Relationship with Indian Tribes, 16 FCC Rcd. 4078, 4079 
(2000). The respondents argued that their tribal consultation policy did not create enforceable rights, 
and regardless, the FCC satisfied its commitment by holding consultations in 2015. Corrected Brief 
for Respondents, supra note 88 at 32–33, 35–36. 
 102 Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1106. 
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posed rules in 2015.103 Even though the prior notice of proposed rulemaking did 
not need to forecast the precise final rule to be implemented after the notice-and-
comment period, the FCC did not even make searchable maps or digital shape-
files available to the public.104 Without maps, interested parties did not compre-
hend the full impact of the proposed rural limitation because they could not see 
which communities would lose subsidies.105 Additionally, the FCC improperly 
adopted the facilities requirement and rural limitation without starting a new no-
tice-and-comment rulemaking proceeding as it had promised.106 The procedural 
error caused harm because the petitioners possessed more relevant knowledge 
that they could have shared with the FCC, but they were not given the opportuni-
ty.107 Crucially, the court held that when an agency proposes substantial rule 
changes, it must hold a comment period of at least thirty days, so that interested 
parties can provide thoughtful feedback.108 The court therefore held that the lack 
of an adequate comment period was a violation of the APA.109 
                                                                                                                           
 103 See id. at 1116. The proposal called for using the Department of Agriculture’s rule excluding 
towns or cities with populations greater than 10,000. Id. The final rule, instead, excluded “urbanized 
areas” and “urban clusters” with total populations less than 25,000 people. Id. Conceivably, under the 
final rule, towns with populations less than 10,000 people could be excluded from Tribal Lifeline 
services if located in an “urbanized area” or “urban cluster,” despite having a small population. Id. 
 104 See id. (explaining that without making available either searchable maps or “shapefiles” dur-
ing the comment period, affected parties could not realize the impact of the rule until the agency took 
final action). Shapefiles are digital maps containing geographic features’ geometric locations. Nicholas 
O. Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1323, 1346 (2016). Geometric location is 
the “physical positional information,” including coordinates like latitude and longitude, “in a particular 
reference system.” What Is Geometric Location, IGI GLOBAL, https://www.igi-global.com/dictionary/
positioning-methods-and-technologies-in-mobile-and-pervasive-computing/43476 [https://perma.cc/
4ZM5-TNPK]. 
 105 Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1116. Under the proposed limitation, some towns with popu-
lations under 10,000 people would lose Tribal Lifeline eligibility, in contrast to the rural limitation 
proposal in 2015 which excluded towns above 10,000 people. Id. It is possible that impacted parties 
would have submitted comments, or better-informed comments, if they saw the specific consequences 
of the changed eligibility requirements, on a town-to-town basis. See id. (noting that the FCC provid-
ed an unsatisfactory opportunity for meaningful comment). 
 106 See id. (explaining that even though an agency could issue multiple orders based on a single 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, in this case, the FCC suggested to interested persons that they did not 
need to submit additional comments about a facilities requirement or rural limitation until the FCC start-
ed a new notice-and-comment period). 
 107 See id. at 1117 (explaining that petitioners could have submitted comments about the rural 
maps, consumer cost data, updated information about facilities-based providers losing eligibility, and 
economic studies, if they had had the opportunity to submit them). 
 108 See id. (citing Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 652 F.3d 431, 453 (3d Cir. 2011) and Petry, 
737 F.2d at 1201) (holding that the two weeks of the Sunshine Period between the draft order on Oc-
tober 26 and the public notice on November 9 was not an “adequate period for eliciting meaningful 
comments”). In Prometheus Radio Project, the FCC proposed a rule about adopting a new approach 
to a certain type of ownership. 652 F.3d at 447. The FCC held a ninety-day comment period, and then 
permitted reply comments for an additional sixty days. Id. Just before the final hearing on the pro-
posed rule, the chair of the FCC published an Op-Ed in the New York Times and a press release with 
a proposal for the rule. Id. at 448, 453. The chair invited additional comment for twenty-eight days. Id. 
It was not disputed that the Op-Ed and press release violated the APA’s notice-and-comment require-
II.-150 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
III. THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S DECISION TO CREATE A BRIGHT LINE RULE FOR 
COMMENT PERIOD TIMELINES WAS INCONSISTENT WITH CASE LAW, 
MODERN AGENCY BEHAVIOR THEORY, AND THE SPIRIT OF THE APA 
Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled clearly and 
consistently with prior case law on substantive matters, it did not do so on pro-
cedural matters.110 The substantive analysis closely followed a line of cases 
requiring agencies to provide reasoned explanations for departing from prior 
policy and reconcile the rule with contradictory past findings.111 Although the 
D.C. Circuit’s substantive holding was consistent with the case law and policy 
goals of the APA, its procedural holding was not.112 Part A argues that the pro-
cedural holding was inconsistent with prior case law, and Part B asserts that it 
was contrary to agency behavior theory and the spirit of the APA.113 
                                                                                                                           
ments. Id. at 453. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that on the whole, the FCC 
failed to comply with the APA with issuing the rule because the initial proposal was too vague and the 
public was not aware of any specific approaches until the Op-Ed and press release. Id. In Petry, the 
D.C. Circuit held that the Department of Agriculture reasonably waived notice-and-comment to meet 
a statutory deadline for implementing budget cuts because comment periods are at least thirty days, 
but should be closer to sixty according to the Administrative Conference. 737 F.2d at 1201–02. 
 109 Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1117–18. 
 110 See Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n v. FCC, 921 F.3d 1102, 1105–06, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (vacating the 
FCC’s adoption of the facilities requirement and rural limitation because: (1) the FCC’s actions were 
arbitrary and capricious because it did not provide a reasoned and well-evidenced explanation for the 
change; and (2) the action contained procedural deficiencies because two weeks was an inadequate 
comment period, considering that the FCC said it would hold new notice-and-comment rulemaking 
for any subsequent Tribal Lifeline program changes after the 2015 order). 
 111 See id. at 1110–11, 1114 (citing Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 
(2016) and FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513–14 (2009)) (holding that the FCC 
failed to consider the impact of the changes on the program and to justify the policy reversal on for-
bearance in light of previous findings). In Encino Motorcars, LLC, the Department of Labor adopted a 
rule removing car service advisors’ exemption from Fair Labor Standards Act requirements. 136 S. 
Ct. at 2123. The Supreme Court held that the rule was arbitrary and capricious because the Depart-
ment of Labor did not explain its change in position and many parties had relied on its previous inter-
pretation. Id. at 2126. In Fox Television Stations Inc., the FCC adopted a stricter enforcement policy 
about indecent depictions on television. 556 U.S. at 517. The change was not arbitrary and capricious 
because the FCC was forthright in its policy change and the change was rational. Id. Technological 
advancement made it more feasible for broadcasters to “bleep out offending words.” Id. at 518. 
 112 See supra note 110 and accompanying text (explaining the National Lifeline Ass’n holding). 
 113 See infra notes 114–125 and accompanying text (Part A); infra notes 126–136 and accompa-
nying text (Part B). 
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A. The Thirty-Day Minimum for Comment Periods Is at Odds with the 
Supreme Court’s Holding in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power  
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council 
The procedural holding in National Lifeline Ass’n v. FCC is inconsistent 
with prior case law.114 The D.C. Circuit defied Supreme Court precedent, 
namely, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council.115 In Vermont Yankee, the Supreme Court admonished the D.C. Cir-
cuit for incorrectly overturning an agency action because the agency did not 
employ procedures beyond those required by Section 553 of the APA.116 Sec-
tion 553 of the APA established the maximum procedural requirements that the 
courts can impose upon agencies.117 The majority opinion stated that a court 
may not impart its own opinions upon an agency of what a suitable procedure 
entails, where Congress delegated particular functions to an agency.118 The 
Supreme Court cited the Senate and House Reports on the APA and the Attor-
                                                                                                                           
 114 See infra notes 115–125 and accompanying text (explaining why the procedural holding in 
National Lifeline Ass’n is inconsistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence). 
 115 See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 546, 548 
(1978) (overturning the D.C. Circuit’s holding for demanding procedure above what the APA re-
quires); Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1117 (holding that a thirty-day minimum comment period is 
necessary for rule changes). The Supreme Court ruled the way it did in Vermont Yankee not only 
because the agency had complied with the APA, but also as a message to courts that they may not 
“add to the procedures otherwise laid down in positive law.” Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, 
Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 874 (2007). Court-imposed procedures 
would undermine the APA’s goals of “predictability, informality, and flexibility” because agencies 
would employ additional procedures to preempt legal challenges. Id. 
 116 435 U.S. at 525. The D.C. Circuit overturned an Atomic Energy Commission rule because of 
deficient proceedings, even though the Commission employed the procedures required by the APA. 
Id. at 535. In particular, the D.C. Circuit faulted the Commission for disallowing discovery or cross-
examination during the rulemaking proceedings. Id. at 541. On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that 
absent compelling circumstances for additional processes, a court may not overturn an agency rule 
that was adopted with the minimum APA rulemaking procedures. Id. at 548. The minimum proce-
dures entail: (1) publishing a notice of proposed rulemaking, (2) receiving public comment, and (3) 
publishing a final rule with a “concise general statement of [the rule’s] basis and purpose.” 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553 (2018). The Vermont Yankee ruling was also striking because the decision was unanimous. 
Gillian E. Metzger, From the Files of the Supreme Court: The Hidden Story of Vermont Yankee, 31 
ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 5, 6 (2006). Justices Brennan and Marshall, both considered judicial activ-
ists who would be open to more active court involvement in administrative law, joined the majority 
opinion. Id. 
 117 Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 523–24 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553); see supra note 116 (identifying the 
statutory minimum procedures to informal rulemaking). 
 118 Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 525. Scholars suggest that the Circuit Courts of Appeal needed a “Ver-
mont Yankee II” to affirm that courts are not entitled to transform the rulemaking process into an ad-
judicatory proceeding, because the courts have not heeded the Supreme Court’s caution in the first 
Vermont Yankee. Beermann, supra note 115, at 901. Professor Paul Verkuil suggests that Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the landmark Supreme 
Court case about agency deference, was actually “Vermont Yankee II.” Paul R. Verkuil, The Wait Is 
Over: Chevron as the Stealth Vermont Yankee II, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 921 (2007). 
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ney General’s Manual on the APA.119 All three sources supported the proposi-
tion that the APA was intended only to outline the minimum procedures for 
rulemaking, reserving discretion to the agencies for additional procedural de-
vices.120 
Forty years after the Supreme Court instructed the D.C. Circuit not to im-
part its own understanding of procedural best practices onto agency rulemak-
ing, the D.C. Circuit did exactly that.121 The APA requires that an agency: (1) 
publish a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register, (2) give inter-
ested parties a chance to submit comments, (3) consider the comments, and 
then (4) publish the final substantive rule, along with a succinct statement ex-
plaining the rationale for the rule.122 The APA does not specify a minimum 
number of days for the second step.123 Therefore, the D.C. Circuit imposed the 
judges’ own ideas of what a sufficient comment period would entail, above 
what the APA explicitly required.124 In doing so, it flouted Supreme Court 
precedent, most specifically, Vermont Yankee.125 
                                                                                                                           
 119 Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S at 545–46 (citing THE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 31, 35; H.R. REP. NO. 
79-1980, at 9, 16–17 (1946); S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 14–15 (1945)). 
 120 Id. The Supreme Court listed a few reasons for interpreting § 553 as leaving discretion to the 
agencies for how best to utilize procedural devices. Id. at 546–47. First, judicial review would be 
unpredictable if courts reviewed agency proceedings to see whether they were tailored to reach the 
“best” or “correct” result. Id. at 546. Second, courts would be reviewing the agency’s processes on the 
back end, with much more information available than what the agencies would have when structuring 
their proceedings. Id. at 547. Third, there would be little to no benefit of informal rulemaking if pro-
cedures were subject to such specific inquiry. Id. at 547–48. 
 121 See Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1117 (establishing a thirty-day minimum comment period 
for informal agency rulemaking). 
 122 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
 123 See id. (lacking a minimum comment period). Although the word “participate” may presup-
pose sufficient time to participate, the APA does not explicitly state a time frame. See id. (showing the 
omission of a specified minimum comment period). 
 124 See Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S at 525 (prohibiting courts from remanding agency decisions on pro-
cedural grounds where agencies meet APA requirements); Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1117–18 
(remanding an agency decision on procedural grounds under the court-created rule that notice-and-
comment must be at least thirty days). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit hinted that to 
require additional procedures would violate Vermont Yankee in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. EPA, 803 
F.2d 545, 559 (10th Cir. 1986). In Phillips Petroleum, the EPA refused to add thirty additional days to 
a forty-five-day comment period for a regulation of underground injection control on Native Ameri-
can lands to thirty days. 803 F.2d at 559. The Tenth Circuit held that the EPA’s decision was not “ar-
bitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion” because there is no statutory minimum number of days 
for a notice-and-comment period under § 553. Id. Section 553 only requires an “opportunity to partic-
ipate” in rulemaking. Id. For a court to demand more exacting procedural requirements would violate 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Vermont Yankee that courts should defer to agency discretion for 
deciding specific rulemaking procedures. Id. 
 125 See supra note 124 and accompanying text (explaining the holding of Vermont Yankee). Then-
Circuit Judge Brett Kavanaugh expounded a similar critique in his concurrence in American Radio 
Relay League, Inc. v. FCC., 524 F.3d 227, 246 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); Matthew 
S. Brooker, Taking the Path Less Travelled: FOIA’s Impact on the Tension Between the D.C. Circuit 
and Vermont Yankee, 102 VA. L. REV. 1101, 1102–03 (2016). In American Radio Relay League, Inc., 
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B. The Thirty-Day Minimum for Comment Periods Is Inconsistent with 
Modern Agency Behavior Theory and the Spirit of the APA 
Moreover, setting a thirty-day minimum for comment periods is incon-
sistent with modern theories of agency behavior and the spirit of the APA.126 
The APA as a whole reflects a significant degree of judicial deference towards 
agency expertise.127 Recognizing that agencies have different legislative man-
dates to complete different types of work and solve different types of prob-
lems, no one rigid procedure suits the needs and complexities of all agen-
cies.128 Where thirty days may have been an appropriate time frame for parties 
to provide meaningful comment about the facilities requirement and rural limi-
tation for the Tribal Lifeline Program, thirty days may be too few or too many 
for another agency’s rulemaking.129 As the D.C. Circuit itself recognized in 
                                                                                                                           
the FCC published redacted studies with its proposed rule. 524 F.3d at 246. The D.C. Circuit remand-
ed for new proceedings, holding that interested parties would only have a reasonable opportunity to 
submit comment if they had access to the unredacted versions of the studies. Id.; see Portland Cement 
Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (requiring agencies to disclose technical 
data or studies on which they relied in developing proposed rules). Judge Kavanaugh responded in his 
concurring opinion that Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, the D.C. Circuit precedent that the 
court relied on in the case, stood on a “shaky legal foundation” after Vermont Yankee. American Ra-
dio, 524 F.3d at 246 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); Portland Cement Ass’n, 486 F.2d at 393. Because 
the Supreme Court said in Vermont Yankee that courts cannot hold agencies to higher procedural 
standards than those prescribed by Congress in the APA, Portland Cement, which required agencies 
to disclose certain types of data, should no longer be good law. American Radio, 524 F.3d at 246 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring); see also Beermann, supra note 115, at 893–94 (pointing to court-
imposed rulemaking requirements that are inconsistent with Vermont Yankee). 
 126 See supra note 121 and accompanying text (summarizing the National Lifeline Ass’n proce-
dural holding); supra notes 127–136. 
 127 See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844–45 (emphasizing the Supreme Court’s tradition of defer-
ring to administrative interpretation); FCC v. Scheiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965) (stating that Con-
gress intended agencies to arrange their own administrative procedures because they are most familiar 
with the problems they are seeking to solve). Courts have a narrow scope of review of agency deci-
sions and may only set aside unlawful actions. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). At the time Congress passed the 
APA, the prevailing theory among the legal community was that agencies were full of “men bred to 
the facts,” who were the best to make decisions about their work, subject to minimal judicial require-
ments. James M. Landis, The Administrative Process, in FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 
4, at 72–73. 
 128 See generally James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 
357 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980) (explaining that different agencies, because of the differences in the 
industries they regulate, are more susceptible to being influenced by the agencies they regulate than 
others); Agency List, supra note 1 (listing 450 federal agencies of varying size and scope, including 
the Census Bureau, Minority Business Development Agency, Air Quality National Commission, Ar-
chitect of the Capitol, Congressional Budget Office, National Security Agency, Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, Federal Reserve Commission, Geographic Names Board, Centers for Med-
icare and Medicaid Services, Transportation Security Administration, and the Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice). 
 129 See Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1117 (holding that two weeks was insufficient notice for 
the facilities requirement and rural limitation, but thirty days would have been sufficient); Wilson, 
supra note 128, at 366, 373, 392. 
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1984 in Petry v. Block, the Administrative Conference of the United States 
stated that thirty days is often an insufficient amount of time for people to re-
spond to complicated proposals that involve specialized, scientific, or industri-
al materials.130 On the other hand, thirty days may be too many for certain pro-
posed agency rules.131 
The thirty-day minimum comment period is also inconsistent with mod-
ern agency behavior theory.132 The modern theory of agency behavior, reified 
by James Q. Wilson, emphasizes the complexity of agency work and conse-
quently the need for flexible administrative law.133 Modern theory of agency 
behavior posits that agencies’ actions will impact different populations in dif-
ferent ways, so their procedures should reflect that same variety.134 Because 
some agencies are more susceptible to capture by industry than others, a stand-
ard is more appropriate in this context.135 Recognizing the diversity of agency 
                                                                                                                           
 130 737 F.2d 1193, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING, 
supra note 11, at 124); see supra note 39 and accompanying text (explaining Petry’s interpretation of 
the Administrative Conference of the United States’ guidance about comment periods). 
 131 Cf. Connor Raso, Agency Avoidance of Rulemaking Procedures, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 65, 93 
(2015) (arguing that the agencies that are less likely to be sued tend to avoid publishing proposed rules 
for notice-and-comment). Under § 553(b)(3)(B), proposed agency rules can be exempt from the rule-
making requirements when notice-and-comment would be “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to 
the public interest.” Id. at 86. Between 1995 and 2012, agencies circumvented the notice-and-
comment process for approximately fifty-two percent of final agency rulemaking action. Id. at 91. The 
D.C. Circuit’s procedural activism tendencies may produce unintended results because a bright-line 
rule of a thirty-day minimum for notice-and-comment periods might further incentivize agencies to 
seek exemptions to the APA requirements. See id. at 91–92 (explaining the prevalence of agency 
avoidance of notice-and-comment procedures). 
 132 See supra note 121 and accompanying text (summarizing the National Lifeline Ass’n proce-
dural holding); infra notes 133–136 (explaining how Vt. Yankee departs from modern agency behavior 
theory). 
 133 See FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 4, at 72–77 (providing a historical overview 
of agency action theory, including James Q. Wilson’s theory from 1980 as the most recent); Wilson, 
supra note 128, at 373 (calling for a revisit of administrative law theory because agencies have be-
come “coalitions of diverse participants,” composed of careerists, politicians, and professionals with 
competing motives). 
 134 See Wilson, supra note 128, at 373 (illustrating the diversity of agency work and needs). The 
notice requirement in the APA is a standard, not a rule, and that distinction is significant. See 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553(c) (lacking a specific number of days for agency notice-and-comment periods); Anthony J. 
Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 IND. L.J. 1401, 1407 (2015) (ex-
plaining that rules are precise and concretized ahead of time, whereas standards are imprecise, flexible, 
and take context into account). Standards typically involve “ambiguous” terms such as “reasonable,” 
“material,” or “excessive.” Casey & Niblett, supra, at 1047 n.15. 
 135 See Roger G. Noll, Reforming Regulation, in FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 4, 
at 74–75 (explaining why industry leaders seek to influence the decisions of the agencies that regulate 
them, and why, in turn, agencies eventually represent industry leaders’ preferences). The agency cap-
ture theory posits that, over time, an agency will become aligned with the agency it regulates. Id. In-
dustrial leaders, who have capital, are the most likely and able to challenge agency decisions. Id. They 
are also the most likely to assume positions in agencies because they have expertise. Id. The agencies 
that are most susceptible to capture by industry will benefit from notice-and-comment periods that are 
longer than thirty days, because thirty days may not be long enough for parties who are not capturing the 
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circumstances, the D.C. Circuit Court should heed the Supreme Court’s hold-
ing in Vermont Yankee in future cases and focus more on agencies’ substantive 
rationales for their actions than on their rulemaking procedures.136 
CONCLUSION 
In 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
held in National Lifeline Ass’n v. Federal Communications Commission that an 
agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously where it departed from prior policy 
without providing a reasoned explanation, addressing contradictory past find-
ings, and considering reliance interests. Additionally, the court held that an 
agency committed non-harmless procedural error by providing interested par-
ties fewer than thirty days to submit comments on the proposal. Although the 
Federal Communications Commission’s rulemaking process was problematic, 
the D.C. Circuit did not need to, and should not have, established a bright-line 
rule for notice-and-comment periods. Reinforcing the existing notice-and-
comment standard, rather than creating a bright-line rule, would have been 
more appropriate and more consistent with both case law and the spirit of the 
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agency to participate in the process. See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–
1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1064, 1069 (1997) (explaining the problem of industry leaders 
exercising influence over agency rulemaking procedures and shaping final rules). 
 136 See Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S at 558 (holding that legitimate reasons for overturning agency action 
include “substantial procedural or substantive reasons”); Merrill, supra note 135, at 1095 (citing Mo-
tor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983)) (holding that 
courts should ask agencies for more specific rationales, rather than procedures, to support their agency 
decisions, because that approach would better combat agency capture). The D.C. Circuit honed in on 
procedure in National Lifeline Ass’n, even after being instructed in Vermont Yankee to focus on rule 
substance instead. Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 558; see National Lifeline Ass’n, 921 F.3d at 1117 (holding 
that two weeks was an insufficient notice-and-comment period because a minimum of thirty days is 
required). 
